homelessness and poverty are strongly related. Homeless people may or may not be alcoholics, mentally ill, substance abusers, single, or male, but they are, all of them, poor. 8 As historians of welfare have repeatedly shown, poverty alone has not reliably produced sympathy in the hearts and minds of the American public and its legislators; indeed, the poor have as often been regarded with hostility as with compassion or even acceptance. 9 But at least for a time, the plight of the homeless poor did evoke sympathy and compassion, 10 and substantial social resources-ranging from shelter beds to health care--were mobilized to help them.
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See, e.g., BURT, HELPING AMERICA'S HOMELESS, supra note x, at 93 (citing "extreme poverty" as the "common denominator of homelessness.") 9 See, e.g., JOEL F. HANDLER AND WELFARE (1989) . 10 How long a time is open to question. Whether due to "compassion fatigue" or other factors, the sympathy was not boundless, as evidenced by many jurisdictions' enactment of ordinances designed to move the homeless out of places they tended to congregate, such as parks, or otherwise to criminalize behavior associated with homelessness, such as panhandling. Cases testing the legality of such policies include McFarlin v. District of Columbia, 681 A.2d 440 (D.C. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that a statute banning begging near subway stops was a reasonable regulation of begging and therefore constitutional); Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that a statue banning all panhandling in certain areas, banning all panhandling at night, and banning "aggressive panhandling" in all locations throughout the city was a content neutral time, place, and manner restriction and thus constitutional); Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 402 (1995) (upholding an ordinance that made it a crime to camp and store belongings in public parks). Part of what enabled that sympathy was the work of Hopper and his fellow anthropologists, who struggled to themselves understand the lives of the homeless, and then to convey those lives to the rest of us. As Hopper puts it, "impelled by an elemental moralism, we set about telling the story of homelessness in all its unsettling specificity. . . .
We gave them names, showed you their faces, ransacked our fieldnotes for arias of heartbreaking tragedy and quiet heroism." 12 Another part of what enabled sympathy for the homeless was the legal strategy, partly parasitic on the ethnographies, that traded on the "involuntariness" of homelessness. How, advocates argued, could those who "have no realistic choice to live in public places" be punished for acts such as sleeping in parks? 13 What seemed like success at the time, or at least progress, now appears less rosy,
Hopper argues. Here, he is joined by legal colleagues wondering about hidden costs of apparent victories. Homelessness has been approached less as a long term problem of housing or employment than as a short term emergency that can be remedied by more shelter beds and mission meals. 14 The very act of differentiating the homeless, and of 12 P. 193.
13
Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F.Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992) . Pottinger held that Miami's practice "of arresting homeless individuals for harmless, involuntary conduct which they must perform in public" violated the plaintiffs' rights to due process and travel, as well as their rights under the Fourth and Eighth Amendments. On appeal, the case was remanded, Pottinger v. City of Miami, 40 F.3d 1155 (11 th Cir. 1994), and ultimately settled. Pottinger was probably the high water mark of "free to be homeless" cases. Its holdings were rejected in, inter alia, Davison v. City of Tucson, 924 F.Supp. 989 (D. Ariz. 1996) and Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145 (Cal. 1995) .
On the connection between freedom and public spaces in the life of the homeless, see Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 39 UCLA L. REV. 295 (1991).
14 See, e.g., White, supra note x, at 296 (describing as one of the costs of advocates' rhetoric about homelessness "the skewing of low-income housing policy away from coping with those problems, "orphaned" the homeless from the rest of the poor. 15 And the legal and anthropological approaches alike also somehow left race pretty much totally out of the picture-a disconcerting omission given the very high representation of African
Americans among the homeless. 16 One of Hopper's main goals in his book is to "take stock" 17 of these phenomenawhich he ultimately regards as advocacy failures. Though Reckoning With Homelessness has a retrospective cast, its reflections on what has and what has not "worked" nonetheless have implications for thinking about homeless going forward. And we will need to do some thinking. Homelessness has by no means gone away, 18 and, if the front pages of our nation's major newspapers are any indication, homelessness seems to be on its way to being permanent solutions and toward ad hoc crisis intervention" The survey described in BURT, HELPING AMERICA'S HOMELESS, supra note x, at 50 estimated that perhaps as much as 1.3 per cent of the nation's population was homeless at some time during the year beginning February1996. As is explained infra, text accompanying notes x-xx, counting methodologies are highly variable and most counts are contested as too high or too low. Burt devotes a substantial attention to the problems of counting. See id. at 23-46. a "crisis" again.
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In this review, I take up the themes in Hopper's book that bear most on how we are likely to confront-or maybe avoid confronting--this new crisis. Part I considers how the social science world has studied homelessness-both its generation of "facts" about homelessness and its framing of the debate over individual as opposed to structural causes of homelessness. As Reckoning with Homelessness reveals, this debate continues to this day to structure much thinking about homelessness. Yet, on reflection, it is not entirely obvious why it is still so powerful. The line between the "individual" and the "structural" is extremely unstable, and as Hopper himself (sometimes) recognizes, the rhetoric of individual responsibility can easily backfire.
Part II considers how the individual/structural debate has interacted with, or, as
Hopper argues, failed importantly to interact with, other important debates about poverty and race. Here, Hopper's assessment tracks those of legal advocates and raises important questions about why alliances between "the poor" and "the homeless" were never explicitly drawn. Hopper and legal analysts agree that race has figured far less than it should have in debates about homelessness, but they are not entirely clear about why that omission has been problematic. parallels the conclusions-implicit in Hopper's work and explicit elsewhere-that to understand homelessness we must first better understand wealth. But in my view it will not be enough to stop with the psychological or cognitive defense mechanisms that allow those with property to ignore or even disdain those who lack it. For "no property" is not only a lack, but a legal and social state of being. In this legal state, one can plausibly seek rights to sleep outdoors and panhandle aggressively (rights, that is, to be homeless effectively) but one is not entitled to housing or public welfare benefits (rights, that is, to have property).
To understand homelessness, we must at least confront the complexities of this new category.
I. Social Science and the Study of Homelessness
Reckoning with Homelessness does not purport to summarize the massive amount of social science research that has been conducted on homelessness over the last twenty years. 22 As Hopper explains, the Census Bureau conducted counts of both street and shelter homeless in several cities on one night ("S Night") in 1990. P. 131. The counts were widely criticized for bad methods and faulty conclusions. Id. at 135. Hopper asserts that in response to various "research-based criticisms," the Census Bureau "substantially revised its procedures for Census 2000." Id. at 145. modifications of the procedures to be used in future census counts. 32 But its other findings-those that seem closer to Hopper's heart-do not directly bear on numbers, but on quality of life issues:
The most salient lesson to be drawn from this brief study can be put simply: "The street" is not now, if it ever was, synonymous with anarchy. Even here, distinctive rules and routines prevail. . . . "Regulars" [among the homeless at the sites visited] recounted (at times in painstaking detail) the working "rules" of that space, the schedules and addresses of local soup kitchens, the locations of prized out-of-theway havens, the names of potential sources of aid. . . . . Beat cops, security guards, and token-booth clerks at certain sites awakened occupants in time for work each day.
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Notice here how the homeless are naturalized; in having and being subject to rules in their apparently chaotic life, they are more "like" us. Hopper says as much: "Much as the cadre of street dwellers impressed the observers as distinctly "other"-the classic subject of field work-they also met and . One work often noted for the argument that the homeless are in some sense just ordinary people like "us" is JONATHAN KOZOL, RACHEL AND HER CHILDREN (1988). Robert Ellickson has argued that homeless people are not in fact ordinary, see Ellickson, supra note x, at 58, and Lucie White has argued that the images Kozol presents reinforce unconscious racism by "evok[ing] concern for the poor by appealing to race and class privilege, to the desire that is engineered among all groups in this society to be 'white.'" White, supra note x, at 305. by social scientists studying the homeless: why do people become homeless? Is a person's homelessness a function of individual and personal failure, or is it a function of structural forces of which the individual has little or no control? 36 To those who see homelessness primarily 37 in terms of individual responsibility, drug addiction, substance abuse, and mental illness are the factors most frequently cited to explain homelessness. 38 Those who see homelessness primarily in terms of structural factors most frequently cite lack of affordable housing, falling real wages and employment opportunities, and reductions in government benefits. 39 The most measured analysts combine the structural and individual Almost no one is "purely" in one camp or the other. That is, most commentators attributing homelessness primarily to individual factors take at least some account of structural factors, and vice versa. 38 See, e.g., BAUM AND BURNES, supra note x; Ellickson, supra note x. See also JENCKS, supra note x (adding the crack epidemic and reductions in family ties); RICHARD W. WHITE, JR., RUDE AWAKENINGS: WHAT THE HOMELESSNESS CRISIS TELLS US (1992) (failure of the homeless to seek jobs). 39 See., e.g., BARAK, supra note x; ROSSI, supra note x; JOEL BLAU, THE VISIBLE POOR: HOMELESSNESS IN THE UNITED STATES (1992) explanations into what might be called the "vulnerability synthesis," in which personal factors are understood to interact with structural forces in a way that can push someone, in Martha Burt's words, "over the edge" into homelessness:
The trouble begins when very poor people live in cities with very high living costs, and cannot earn enough or receive enough in benefits to cover expenses. In this sense poverty represents a vulnerability, a lower likelihood of being able to cope when the pressure gets too great. It thus resembles serious mental illness, physical handicaps, chemical dependency, or any other vulnerability that reduces one's resilience, and the resilience of one's family and friends. One would be reluctant to say that mental illness causes homelessness, but being mentally ill may well increase the probability that homelessness will result if the person faces a severe crisis. . . . This is the way I now think of poverty in relation to homelessness. Higher poverty rates certainly make more people vulnerable to homelessness. But without the structural pressures of poor-quality jobs, high living costs, pressure from the middle class, and tight housing markets, they would not be homeless. Even without any growth in poverty, increases in these contributing risk factors could easily make more poor people homeless. I think that is what happened in the 1980s. 40 
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MARTHA R. BURT, OVER THE EDGE: THE GROWTH OF HOMELESSNESS IN THE 1980S 198 (1992 . Burt's recent work continues to reflect this thesis. See BURT, HELPING AMERICA'S HOMELESS, supra note x, at 322:
[T]he key to persistent widespread homelessness in the United States appears to be the persistent and worsening mismatch of housing cost to available household resources. With this mismatch as the structural backdrop, personal vulnerabilities combine and interact to increase the risk that a person will be extremely poor, and also become homeless . . . . Without the poverty and the affordable housing crisis, the same vulnerabilities would not produce homelessness. With them, it is to some degree a random process that determines which individuals and households will experience the one crisis too many that will push them into homelessness.
Peter Rossi reached roughly the same conclusion as early as 1989: Among the extremely poor, those with disabilities are the most vulnerable to homelessness. Especially critical are those disabilities that make it difficult for relatives, especially, but also friends, to generously provide shelter and support. In particular, those with chronic mental illness, severe alcoholism, and criminal records do not make good housemates and are eased out from under the protective wing of their relatives and friends. First and foremost is a methodological and archival given: Male gender shaped the terms of access and affiliation in my own ethnographic efforts and dominates the historical record. . . . Second, since the mid-1980s, the wheel of social opinion has turned inexorably forward once again-focusing on families rather than "unattached" men . . . -to the detriment of the men who first gave evidence of the new homelessness. . . . Finally, this study highlights the situation of men, especially the young African American males who make up the bulk of the shelter population in New York, because this group has proved most vulnerable to the dislocations of deindustrialization.
Id. at 13-14. 44 P. 67. inquired "(1) how people became homeless in the first place and (2) the nature of public provision for their shelter once officially certified as homeless." 45 Though the questions seem analytically distinct, with only the first bearing on the "why" of homelessness, they connect through the vector of "choice," which bears directly on the individual/structural debate; Hopper's study seeks to determine whether the homeless choose "to fend for themselves on the street" 46 or are there for some reason beyond their control.
While Hopper acknowledges employment losses, low-cost housing shortages, and dislocations in government relief programs as major causal forces in twentieth century homelessness, 47 he rejects a "strictly linear view" and finds a wide range of events triggering homelessness among his informants. 48 Precipitating events included binge drinking, eviction, deinstitutionalization without follow-up care, and reluctance to overtax family resources. 49 Hopper ultimately rejects the idea of fitting his findings into a "'classification' scheme of 'homeless types,'" preferring to see instead to focus on the variety of problem-solving techniques employed by the homeless in response to the many forces that pushed them toward the streets. employ on an everyday basis is manifest when he turns directly to the question of why the homeless choose the streets over publicly-available shelters. After detailing his own and his informants' experiences of filth, violence, staff disrespect, and danger at public shelters, he concludes that the street dwellers were not "unwilling" to accept assistance, nor did they suffer from impaired judgment or other pathology-all allegations raised by service providers during the period in question. 51 Given the degrading conditions in the shelters, "the city's offer of refuge was a tarnished one," 52 and thus the "'inability' or 'unwillingness' of many to accept help was a deliberate decision to seek relief on their own terms." 53 Indeed, "the ethnographic picture reconfirmed the 'complicated meanness' that survival on the streets entails," and experiencing the daily round of soup lines, the frustrations of seeking income assistance, the superior attitude of those who purported to be helping all allowed Hopper to appreciate "the ingenuity and resourcefulness of those who managed despite the odds." Conversely, to the extent that homelessness is caused by personal failure-drug or alcohol addiction, or inability to manage money-the claim for government or charitable assistance must be considerably weaker. Thus, the stakes in interpreting or characterizing the empirical data are considered to be quite high.
Yet it is not clear that these characterizations have the consequences that social scientists such as Hopper attribute to them. If the structural factors in question are "the housing market" or "loss of high paying factory jobs," is it really likely that governmentespecially a Republican dominated government-will be moved to intervene? Many believe that the purpose of government is to facilitate the orderly operation of markets, not to interfere with them. On the other side, some "personal" or "individual" failings have provoked government responses, especially where the problem in question, such as mental illness, renders the afflicted vulnerable to abuse by others. New York State's response to recent scandals involving the mistreatment of the non-institutionalized mentally ill living in private "homes" illustrates this phenomenon.
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But even if it were true that "structural" causes of homelessness were more likely to 56 The scandal involved the placement of deinstitutionalized mentally ill persons into nursing homes and other facilities that offered them nothing in the way of treatment and whose conditions may have been more inhumane than the hospitals from which they had been released. be addressed than "individual" causes, the line between the structural and the individual is hardly clear. Labor market changes lead (sometimes) to job instability, which in turn leads (sometimes) to episodes of homelessness, which may (sometimes, e.g., where the homeless person in question is a single mother) disrupt children's educational continuity, which in turn leads (sometimes) to behavioral and emotional problems affecting a child's ability to learn, which may (sometimes) lead down the road to problems gaining stable employment.
What in this is "structural" and what "individual"?
Since the lines between the "structural," and the "individual" seem so indistinct, and since the political valence of the characterizations seem so questionable, it seems worthwhile to ask why these categories continue to organize thinking about the homeless.
One would like to speculate that Hopper's thinking reflects the historical period, principally the 1980s, during which he was most active-a period in which Ronald Reagan's portrait of the "welfare queen" could capture the public imagination. This hypothesis is, however, too optimistic. As one historian of welfare puts it, "the category 'undeserving poor' has echoed across two centuries; it persists, today, as vividly as a century and a half ago." 57 Nonetheless, despite the durability of the rhetoric of desert and merit, it is worth considering whether a change in the terms of the debates about the problem of homelessness would be useful in any way. It seems safe to bet that, given current See Baron, supra note x, at 229-35. 62 Hopper argues that in any event the "translation" of data-"the derivation of practical implications of research results, the distillation of core findings, . . . the identification of specific relevancies to current policy deliberations"-no longer be left to legislative aides or to attorneys. P. 212.
II. Homelessness, Poverty, and Race
Over the past twenty years, advocates for the homeless have won some noteworthy victories, including more shelter beds (and better shelter conditions), more support for transitions from homelessness into housing, and a heightened appreciation of the coordination of efforts required to prevent the recently-housed from falling back into homelessness.
63 Yet large numbers of people remain homeless (or at least vulnerable to homelessness), 64 Hopper is not alone in seeking to assess the gains and losses of homeless advocacy over time. His counterparts in the legal community have also sought to assay the overall success of their efforts in the courts and in the legislature. Hopper and his legal colleagues' assessments roughly converge on a single tone, regret. They also largely converge in their analysis of the missteps that have attended advocacy efforts to date. Three missteps are repeatedly cited: (1) the treatment of the homelessness problem as an emergency, warranting the kind of get-through-the-immediate-crisis response appropriate to natural disasters or traumatic injuries rather than long-term solutions; (2) the failure to address the underlying structural causes of homelessness, such as the need for more affordable housing; and (3) the omission of issues pertaining to race in advocacy for the homeless. These three issues are clearly interrelated, with the first being a possible cause of the second, and the second being a possible cause of the third.
Hopper approaches the first problem, that of treating homelessness as a temporary emergency, largely in the context of Callahan v. Carey, the New York case brought to establish a right to shelter for indigent homeless men in New York City. 68 Hopper is aware of the limits of the Callahan consent decree, noting especially the distracting attention to details that had to be "spelled out in obsessive fashion-space between beds, quality of food, ratio of men to toilet facilities, arrangements for storage of belongings." 69 Still, Hopper 67 P. 14.
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The procedural history of the Callahan case is described infra note x. See, e.g., Foscarinis, supra note x, at 332-33:
For the legal advocates, the problem of treating homelessness as an emergency when in fact it is not connects to the second advocacy misstep, that of ignoring the deeper causes of homeless, such as lack of affordable housing and losses of jobs that pay decently.
The argument here is not (just) that advocating for more shelter did not itself solve the problem of housing for the poor, but that it affirmatively hampered the solution of the underlying problems that lead to homelessness. As Gary Blasi puts it:
It is possible that the final record may suggest that advocacy aimed at ending homelessness actually prolonged it by diverting attention and resources from the wider issues of poverty and inequality. . . . Defining the problem as the problem of 'the homeless' allows moderately liberal communities to 'solve' the problem of extreme poverty and discrimination by reinventing the almshouse in the form of mass shelters. The creation of mass shelters, in turn, inevitably leads to an understandable 'not in my backyard' . . . reaction to these facilities, and equally inevitably, against 'the homeless' who will inhabit them. 75 Lucie White puts it this way:
The crisis of 'homelessness' has not forged a new national commitment to make housing affordable for the poor. Nor has the crisis advanced the national discussion about how to finance and manage low-income housing on a wide scale. . . . And, with the new money that has been routed to 'the homeless,' new interests have sprung up. A growing sector of service providers and academic researchers are inevitably-even if unintentionally-becoming invested in stabilizing 'homelessness' as a permanent crisis, so their skills won't become obsolete, and their jobs won't go away.
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[W]here homelessness results from flood, hurricane or other natural disaster, and not from poverty, emergency solutions may be appropriate and effective. In those cases, once the sudden emergency is addressed, its victims are generally able to return to housing stability. Where the cause is poverty-related-such as inability to find affordable housing . . . -then emergency shelter is not a sufficient solution to homelessness: once the emergency need is met, there is nowhere to go. 75 Blasi, And We Are Not Seen, supra note x, at 569. 76 White, supra note x, at 297-98.
In other words, the attention to (emergency) shelter was a serious distraction, causing an irrevocable loss of resources that should have been devoted to (long-term) structural problems but were instead diverted into a new shelter "industry." 77 Hopper has a slightly different take on how advocacy efforts distracted from attention to longer term solutions. As he sees it, "the bulk of national advocacy efforts
[was] deployed within the beltway," and amounted, in essence, to lobbying for programs.
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Even where the efforts were "broad-based (e.g., supportive housing for persons with severe mental illness . . .),"
79 and even where they were successful, they contained a hidden trap.
Advocates who obtained what they sought had to ensure that programs were renewed and funds reappropriated as expiration dates arrived; those advocates became "beholden to a growing constituency of programs dependent on federal funding." 80 Advocacy was diverted, in other words, by the need to preserve its own gains.
On the other hand, Hopper basically agrees that the advocates made mistakes in their framing of the issue. "It would have been an act of constructive mischief," he writes, to shift from a demand of passive resettlement ('more housing') to one of active 77 See, e.g., White, supra note x, at 300 ("'homelessness' worked so well to mobilize public attention that little media space or citizen energy has remained available to address other housing issues.") For more on the costs of shelter remedies, see HOCH & SLAYTON, supra note x, at 232 (arguing that shelter facilities have been transformed into "long-term caretaking institutions" in which the homeless are segregated in a way that "not only perversely sets them apart from other citizens but relegates them to the inferior status of worthy dependents.") reengagement ('give us a chance to work-and let us worry about a place to live.')" 81 And, like the lawyers, he is reflective about and critical of the unintended consequences the methods through which he worked. Here, Hopper criticizes the naturalizing tendencies of his (and his colleagues') own ethnographies, which portrayed homelessness as "an exotic world, but one that has been safely domesticated; its protagonists, tantalizingly different
from, yet plainly recognizable to, those of us secure at home."
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The excitement of ethnography, Hopper explains, "lies . . . in redeeming the currency of actions and utterances whose face value would seem to be reckless, stupid, selfdestructive, or crazy." 83 But in showing that the homeless were not as odd or contemptible as they might seem, "causal analysis" of why they were on the streets in the first place was "scanted." 84 The ethnographers took the homeless where they found them, without asking how they came to be there; in their accounts ("sheaves of thick description"), 85 "disorder tends to be taken as a given, its genesis of secondary import to the task of capturing its manifold intricacies and plumbing its secrets." 86 In structure, Hopper's self-critique strongly parallels those of the lawyers'; ultimately rather than changing the status quo, the ethnographies, like the efforts to gain more shelter beds and palliative programs, entrenched Hafetz, supra note x, at 1247. See also Blasi, And We Are Not Seen, supra note x, at 566 (explaining that the "problem of homelessness" was constructed over time, and arguing that "there are important 'framing effects' (e.g., 'homelessness' vs. 'poverty') in public discourse.") 89 Blasi, And We Are Not Seen, supra note x, at 576. See also Daniels, supra note x, (describing "shifting images" of the homeless, beginning with the derelict). 90 White, supra note x, at 292. See also Blasi, And We Are Not Seen, supra note x, at 567 ("Advocates were . . . pragmatic: The focus on homelessness produced some results, But other explanations are less kind. Gary Blasi has argued that attitudes toward the homeless are embedded in cognitive networks that somehow render it "easier for people to identify with the harsh reality of homelessness than with that of mere poverty," 91 and that advocates traded on, rather than seeking to alter, those cognitive biases to avoid negative attitudes toward poverty and blacks. 92 The most negative explanation asserts that images of the homeless as white (or at least, as not explicitly minority) are the product of "unconscious racism."
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Whatever the explanation, the failure to deal with race has come at a price. For one thing, it has contributed to the separation between homeless rights advocacy and poverty law practice 94 and thereby kept homeless advocacy from achieving its potential to "bring[] together people whose initial interests were more narrowly focused on housing issues, welfare, education, and so on." 95 But far more significant than the loss of strategic alliances is the way in which the absence of discussion of the connections between race and whereas a diffuse focus on poverty seemed likely to produce nothing, particularly in the Reagan years.") 91 Blasi, And We Are Not Seen, supra note x, at 567. See also Blasi, Social Policy and Social Science, supra note x, at 209 ("whereas it is difficult for most people to imagine the myriad detailed consequences of simply being very poor, it is easier for everyone to imagine being cold, being lost, being very far from-or without-a home.") 92 Blasi, Advocacy and Attribution, supra note x, at 219-20; Blasi, And We Are Not Seen, supra note x, at 576. Hafetz, supra note x, at 1247-48. 95 Blasi, Advocacy and Attribution, supra note x, at 234. homelessness have affirmatively distorted understanding of the causes of the homelessness problem and of the depth of race discrimination in the US:
Poverty is implicated in homelessness not only in the present. Cross-sectional and even longitudinal studies of homeless individuals fail to capture the fact that the myriad consequences of poverty and discrimination accumulate over time, over generations. The consequences of poverty and racism in the past are revealed in the present not only as poverty but also as poor educational attainment and limited skills, exhausted family resources and social networks, and so on. In the homelessness of today we see not only the interaction of today's poverty and today's personal decrements and disadvantages but also the consequences of poverty and discrimination long ago and long forgotten.
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The claim here is that even the "structural" account of homelessness is seriously incomplete and misleading because it does not attend to the way race and past discrimination have affected the human and other resources of those who must now compete for ever scarcer jobs and ever less affordable housing. "foreign" subject that could be studied like any other "exotic" population. 101 "The homelessness portrayed in these studies," Hopper observes, "tends to be sequestered, captive, estranged." 102 But worse than the distortion in the picture of the homeless themselves was the failure to attend to the world from which they had emerged, a world 97 P. 157. deeply formed by race, but from which race had been sanitized. Our understanding of the way race works, inside and outside geographically African American neighborhoods, has suffered in consequence.
The sense of lost opportunity is palpable here, yet it is not entirely clear what, precisely, is being regretted. It would be one thing if more directly associating homelessness and race would have led to instrumental gains in the form, for example, of more litigation successes, but neither Hopper nor the legal advocates make such a claim. If anything, the argument sometimes flirts with and sometimes explicitly asserts the idea that the issue of race was avoided precisely because, given existing negative stereotypes, allowing it a role would have been poor strategy in the short term. 103 The crux of the lament seems to be the failure to explore how, over time, the twinned forces of race and poverty combined to render blacks ever more susceptible to homelessness. See supra text accompanying notes xx-yy.
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See Blasi, And We Are Not Seen, supra note x, at 592 ("we have nothing, on a purely metatheoretical level, equivalent to the computer models in population biology that capture both the structures of risk and incentive and the contours of individual vulnerability, revealing in simulation the nonobvious consequences of the interactions between the individual and the ecological.")
III. Homelessness and Wealth
One of the reasons to analyze the errors of the past is to help answer the question, frequently asked in homeless advocacy, "where do we go from here"? 105 See, e.g., O'FLAHERTY, supra note x, at 275 (whose last chapter is entitled "What We Should Do") ethnographers must more aggressively manage their own data: "This would mean taking seriously the translation process itself-the derivation of practical implications of research results, the distillation of core findings, the delineation of essential qualifiers of context or design, the identification of specific relevancies to current policy deliberations." 109 No longer can these tasks be "left to legislative aides or jousting attorneys."
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But perhaps Hopper's most provocative suggestion is one he makes almost in passing, and though I quoted it in the introduction to this review, it is worth reading again:
It no longer suffices (if it ever did) to ask what it is about the homeless poor that accounts for their dispossession. One must also ask what it is about 'the rest' of us that has learned to ignore, then tolerate, only to grow weary of, and now seeks to banish from sight the ugly evidence of a social order gone badly awry?
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Hopper here seems to be saying that the ethnographers have been studying the wrong thing.
Instead of capturing the "manifold intricacies" 112 and the "shadowed details" 113 of life on the streets and in shelters, they should have been studying the people who passed the homeless by. The ethnographers studied the poorest of the poor, but maybe they should have been studying the rich. Specifically, Blasi, Social Policy and Social Science, supra note x. In that article, Blasi wrote: "This . . . is a call for social scientists . . . to look at the wider society and the also argued that "if the underlying problem is how to end mass homelessness, then social scientists will have to focus less on homeless people and more on the people whose decisions (or acquiescence) result in the policies that produce homelessness."
115 Blasi has repeatedly suggested that more attention be paid to how images of the homeless are created and processed, in order to understand "why average Americans are affected by images of homelessness, but not by images of extreme poverty." 116 Part of Blasi's concern, as we have seen, is with the way in which failure to challenge attitudes about the homeless leave intact negative stereotypes about the remainder of the poor. 117 A related concern, going forward, is with cognitive processes generally; the more advocates know about how people think, Blasi argues, the more they can "take account of attributional beliefs, and sometimes even shape them" in their own advocacy.
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If Hopper is correct in his conclusion that even the best ethnography of the homeless only contributes to their neglect, then surely it cannot hurt to turn to the "rest of 122 Because the Court has also held that housing is not a fundamental right, 123 there is no right not to be homeless. Having no property puts you in a legal class that is quite unique.
The legal condition of "no property" helps explain the otherwise mysterious strand of homelessness advocacy that has sought to vindicate rights to panhandle on subways, 124 to sleep in public parks at night, 125 and to sit around idly in public libraries. 126 See, e.g., Daniels, supra note x, at 729 ("Even when criminalization lawsuits are successful, the rights established are negative rights, in that at most they restrict ways in which government can punish homeless people for engaging in certain types of behavior, such as begging or living in public.")
Conclusion
Homelessness is not a new phenomenon, 129 and homelessness may be a problem that will never disappear. 130 
